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Introduction: environmental paradox?
There is increasing recognition of an apparent paradox with respect to certain
dimensions of environmental quality. Some measures of environmental quality, with
US air quality being the focus here, have clearly improved over time. However, at the
same time that this improvement has occurred, surveys of individuals indicate that
they believe that air quality is not improving, but rather is worsening.(1) Although
the specific case of US air quality is emphasized here, the paradox is more generalö
many people throughout the developed world believe that specific, measurable dimen-
sions of environmental quality are deteriorating when the facts argue otherwise. The
public policy implications of this will be seen, however, to be far from clear.
Tech Environmental, Inc. (1999) reviewed publicly available data on energy con-
sumption and emissions and determined that there had been, from 1970 to 1997, a 77
million tons per year reduction in the six Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
criteria pollutants; in percentage terms, this represented a 34% reduction over the
period.(2)
However, in September 1999, International Communications Research (ICR, 1999)
conducted a large poll in which it was found that Americans typically think that air
quality has worsened over the past decade.(3) Faced with the specific question, ``Do
you believe the nation's air has gotten better or worse in the last ten years?'' 61%
reported ``worse'', 13% reported ``about the same'', and only 22% of respondents felt
the air to be ``better'', Moreover, most of the respondents indicated that air quality was
worse from their ``own personal experiences''.
Possible explanations for the paradox
The FCAP site definitely gives the impression that Americans are misinformed, or
at least uninformed, in their perceptions. It is possible, for example, that a biased,
pro-environment media is consciously or unconsciously misinforming Americans,
perhaps by focusing on `bad news', which might sell better than good news in the
competitive media marketplace. There is a common presumption that what we see in
our newspapers, magazines, and in popular books (with titles like Silent Spring, Laying
Waste, America the Poisoned, Currents of Death, and the like) represents a biased
perspective.
Also environmental groups may deliberately misinform their constituents. Environ-
mental groups are, indeed, businesses like any other and revenue might be easier to
generate by focusing on degradation rather than progress. Additionally, scientists
investigating air quality issues (atmospheric modelers, epidemiologists, biologists, and
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(1)Indeed, the Foundation for Clean Air Progress (FCAP) has as its mission educating Americans
about the progress already made and likely to occur in the future.
See http://www.cleanairprogress.org/index.asp.
(2)The EPA puts the progress over this period at 29% (see http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd00/).
(3)Although progress in the period 1989^99 might differ negatively from that reported for the
entire period 1970^97, that is not the case; improvements in emissions and even more dramatic
environmental quality improvements occurred in the recent period (for more details see http://
www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd00/).so on) are themselves hardly disinterested observers with regard to the disbursement of
funds for scientific research; biasing perceptions of air quality might be thought to be
in their interest.
Further, the tone of the environmental debate continues to be that environmental
quality generally, and perhaps air quality specifically, is a moral struggle between the
greens and the pollutersöbetween the good guys and the bad guys. It is possible that
employing polarizing ad hominem tactics has resulted in generalized disdain for
polluters that spills over into air quality perceptions that are very resistant to change,
regardless of the `facts'.
Yet, there are counterarguments. Many books and articles have documented spe-
cific and general environmental improvements, with Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical
Environmentalist (2001) being given considerable recent press coverage.(4) And, as
already noted, the polled respondents' most commonly cited reason for feeling that
air quality is getting worse in the USA is that this perception stems from their ``own
personal experiences''. Might more be going on?
A proposed economic explanation
A resolution of the paradox may lie in a growing gap between the levels of air quality
that people desire and the levels they receive, despite growth in the latter. There are
many reasons why the psychological perception of `more being less' could arise.
A first consideration involves the noninstantaneous nature of changed desires,
changed reality, and changed perceptions. That is, there might be a lag in perceptions
of cleanup relative to the cleanup that has actually occurred. However, although it is
possible that improving US air quality measures are perceived with a lag, it is difficult
to see how unperceived air quality improvement could be perceived as deterioration.
There are, though, compelling economic arguments that there has been a failure to
regulate as strictly, over time, as is desired by the American public. First, considering
traditional economic variables, air quality is a normal good and GDP per capita rose
dramatically over the twenty-seven-year period from 1970 to 1997. In 1970 the chained
1996-dollar GDP per capita and disposable personal income were $17446 and $12823
respectively, rising to $29915 and $21464 by 1997. Hence GDP per capita and dispos-
able personal income have risen 71.5% and 67.4% over the period 1970^97. Taking the
income elasticity of demand for air quality to be unity over this range of income,(5)
implies that the 34% increase in air quality supplied over this period is about half of
what would have been demanded, holding price constant.
Second, substantial advances in technology have lowered the price of air quality
provision over the thirty-year period. Of particular note are the advances in pollution-
monitoring technology that have rendered policy approaches involving economic
incentives feasible. It is widely recognized that employing economic incentives (pollu-
tion taxes, salable emissions rights, and so on) offers substantial efficiency savings
in the order of 50% or more. A price reduction of this magnitude would also increase
the desire of rational people for greater levels of air quality. Combining price changes
due to technological advance with the greater demands due to income growth over the
period, it is easy to see how people might feel that `more is less'.
(4)Lomborg's arguments have received extensive coverage, both somewhat positive (in a discussion
in The Economist on 2 February 2002) and very negative (in, for example, Nature, Science, and
Scientific American).
(5) Because income must be allocated to some expenditure, the best-guess income elasticity, in an
uncertain world, is 1, though McFadden and Leonard (1993) argue that environmental quality is a
superior good.
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Graves, 2002; Graves, 2003). Briefly, suppose that air quality were to grow in optimal
apparent relation to income growth and to price reductions, so that aggregated
individual marginal willingness to pay equaled marginal cost of provision. It turns
out that the demands for air quality would still be understated.
The reason for this is that we generate income to buy the goods that we want. But,
if generating income does not allow individuals to purchase the kinds of goods they
want, rational people will not generate as much income as they would otherwise.
Because air quality is determined collectively, individuals will undergenerate income
with which to `buy' it.(6) The anomalous result is that those caring most for air quality
relative to other goods would generate the least income; hence would look like they
cared least! We are unable to equate the marginal values of all of the goods we care
about (ordinary goods, environmental goods, and leisure); the marginal value of air
quality is understated in the economists' traditional approaches to valuation.
The preceding argument supplements the traditional arguments that the level of air
quality being provided is too low, but to explain the paradox, there would need to be
growth in the extent to which income is undergenerated. But this is exactly what is to
be expected. At some point in the past, the marginal willingness to pay for air quality
and other environmental improvements will have been zero or very low, as in very poor
countries today. Because only private goods would be demanded, there would initially
be no input market failure to generate the proper income levels. But, as income grows,
the marginal values of air quality would be expected to grow as well; hence there will
be a growing amount of `ungenerated' income.
The preceding arguments, taken together, suggest that, despite having made limited
progress in improving air quality, it is still the case that `more feels like less'. (7) The
marginal rate of substitution between ordinary goods and air quality has grown
dramatically over the past three decades, with high and growing marginal values for
air quality relative to the low marginal values of ordinary goods that we possess in
increasing abundance.
Summary and public policy implications
A rationale is provided here, that does not require ignorance or misinformation, for
the observation that US air quality is perceived as getting worse despite documented
improvements. The rationale partly involves traditional income and price effects, either
of which might be separately sufficient to account for the phenomenon under inves-
tigation, possibly operating via a regulatory lag (or a regulatory failure, for example,
because of special interest power).
Moreover, we fail to generate optimal incomes when doing so does not enable us to
acquire more of the goods we want. Because air quality is determined collectively via
various regulations, the traditional approachöbased on a given incomeöwill result in
underproduction that grows over time.
(6)This assumes, for simplicity, independence of air quality from ordinary goods and leisure in the
utility function. If there are private good substitutes, even fairly poor substitutes, income will be
generated to purchase them (see Graves, 2002).
(7)One might envision a supply-and-demand graph of air quality showing as a vertical line an initial
1970 provision of air quality to the left of the 1970 supply-and-demand equilibrium, resulting in a
welfare loss of the traditional sort. By 1997 the collectively determined vertical provision will have
shifted rightward 34% but both the demand-and-supply curves will have shifted far more, creating
an even larger welfare loss. Note that the growing population (205089000 in 1970 versus 272756000
in 1997) will also increase optimal air quality, as more individuals are present to benefit. However,
because the concern here is with individual perceptions, this point is less germane, despite its
relevance for public policy (for example, in benefit^cost analysis).
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purchase of ordinary goods; hence we will purchase more normal goods as our
incomes grow, and more of goods with falling prices. Were we to be politically con-
strained in our consumption of an important class of ordinary goods to growth levels
below those we would have freely chosen, we would feel similarly frustrated.
The application in the present commentary concerns a fairly narrowly defined
measure of US air quality. But, the mode of thinking here relates to more general
environmental and resource concerns. In considering alternative futures, people tend
to be either `doomsters' (for example, Paul Brodeur, Paul Ehrlich, Norman Myers,
Ralph Nader, The Club of Rome, Malthus) or `boomsters' (for example, Herman
Kahn, Bjorn Lomborg, Julian Simon, Elizabeth Whelan). The first group believes
that growth in income and population results in ultimately inevitable declines in
environmental quality and in resource stocks for the future. The second group feels
that growing income increases the demand for environmental quality, while growing
population provides both the minds and the labor supply to solve environmental and
resource problems as they emerge. As both positions are extreme, the more relevant
question would seem to be whether the environment is characterized as being `one step
forward, two steps back' or `two steps forward, one step back'.
I argue here that the environment could be moving `two steps forward, one step
back' when we very much want it to be moving three or four steps forward for every
misstep. The arguments here provide a reasonable explanation for the widespread
popularity of the doomster position, despite a lengthy history of faulty predictions of
mass starvation, environmental collapse, and resource depletion. We may very well be
doing `better' in absolute terms, but worse relative to what we wantöand relative
values are (and always have been) what matter in the economics of public policy.
Philip E Graves
Department of Economics, University of Colorado
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Social science, public policy, and the search for happiness
``I should say that happiness is being where one is and not wanting to be somewhere
else.''
Michael Frayn A Landing on the Sun (page 151)
A common caricature of academic social scientists is that they are `out of touch'. There
are at least two aspects to this perceived sense of disconnectedness. One is that
academic social scientists inhabit an `ivory tower', with high walls and a high vantage
point that isolate and separate their activities from the everyday lived experiences of
`real people'. The second is that social scientists have become disengaged from the
954 Commentariesestablished structures of policymaking and political decisionmaking. They prefer to
critique, or dismiss, from a detached and distant, if principled, position, rather than
risking compromising their critical purity by `dining with the devil' and collaborating
with the central state. Over recent years, concern at this latter cleavage among British
geographers has prompted a rash of writing on the merits and status of so-called
`grey geographies'öresearch outputs designed to inform and influence public policy
(Dorling and Shaw, 2002; Lee, 2002; Peck, 1999). In such debates, fundamental
questions soon emerge about the political role of academic research, the functions of
the public intellectual, and the social purpose of universities. In the search for first
principles, perhaps a unifying starting point could be the aim of maximising well-
beingöto make life as happy as possible for as many people as possible for as much
of the time as possible? Not, of course, unproblematic, but there are worse places to
start.
In the United Kingdom, a fascinating government report was slipped out quietly
over the Christmas period from the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit on what makes
people satisfied with their lives (Strategy Unit, 2003). The report examines survey
evidence of contentment, investigates international differences, and explores demo-
graphic, social, economic, and political factors before reflecting on the policy
implications of knowledge on life satisfaction. Although it may, at first sight, be
reassuring to know that think tanks at the heart of the British government concern
themselves with understanding the well-being and welfare of their population, readers
are curiously, and perhaps rather worryingly, reminded at the top of every one of the
sixty-four pages of the report that ``this is not a statement of government policy''! Even
for those with little interest in the United Kingdom, the many international examples
and comparisons presented in this report are worth a look. However, the creation of
quasi-academic research units such as this within the heart of a government is an
interesting development that is also worth closer examination.
The creation of research units and think tanks within national and subnational
governments both to synthesise and to summarise what is largely academic work is not
new. In the United Kingdom, the Strategy Unit was, until June 2002, known as the
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU). The PIU was created in late 1998 as part of a
package of reforms aimed at strengthening the centre of government following the
election of New Labour. The SU/PIU provides additional, research-project-based
capacity for the Prime Minister's Policy Unit, based in 10 Downing Street, taking a
longer term perspective in its analytical work, to complement the more short-term `fire-
fighting' role that tends to occupy the Policy Unit. A forerunner of this model was the
Central Policy Review Staff, established by the then Prime Minister Edward Health in
1971 to advise the Cabinet on strategic policy issues (Blackstone and Plowden, 1990).
The PIU's aim has been ``to improve the capacity of Government to address
strategic, cross-cutting issues and promote innovation in the development of policy
and the delivery of the Government's objectives'' (PIU, 1999a, page 132), and it quickly
became cast as being in the vanguard of efforts to improve `joined-up government'. The
unit reports directly to the Prime Minister, through the Cabinet Secretary, is primarily
project based in its work, and includes a small central team that helps draw up project
proposals, manage the unit's workload, and follow up project recommendations.
Projects are carried out by small teams, usually of between four and eight people,
including members of the central team and secondees from across government depart-
ments and from beyond, including academia. The issues that this unit has concentrated
on are often intriguingly of international as well as national importance.
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December 1998.(1) These dealt with the development of e-commerce (PIU, 1999b), the
ageing society (PIU, 2000a), the workings of central government in the regions and
local areas (PIU, 2000b), managing cross-cutting issues in Whitehall (PIU, 2000c),
and rural economies (PIU, 1999a). The programme of work therefore resonates strongly
with many of the concerns of contemporary social science. Indeed, since this first wave
of projects, the PIU/SU has gone on to review the social, health, and environmental
implications of trade liberalisation (PIU, 2000d), the future of UK energy supplies and
markets (PIU, 2002), and the policy implications of geographical mobility. It can be
argued that these detailed reports provide a far more concise and readable summary of
major academic thinking in these areas than the material produced by academics
themselves; albeit with a political or policy agenda lying just beneath the surface of
each report.
The study of life satisfaction is revealing in several respects. The work of one
academic and his colleaguesöProfessor Andrew Oswald of the Department of
Economics at the University of Warwicköhas an important influence upon the report.
His current dominance of the field, and talents in disseminating his findings (see http://
www.andrewoswald.com), coupled with government's increasing preference for the
quantification of research findings result, for instance, in the value of a presumably
happy marriage being reported as equivalent to a rise in income of »72000 per annum.
The conundrum that, although more wealth tends to bring greater happiness individ-
ually, happiness has not risen in general as nations become wealthier, is partly explained
by the detrimental effect of income inequalities on happiness. This at least is the case
within Europe. Americans appear, according to the report, to manage to achieve similar
levels of life satisfaction to Europeans despite greater inequalities. Perhaps they
have become acclimatised to this or their greater overall wealth, power, and social
segregation militate against the problems of inequality in the most unequal of nations?
International comparisons of life satisfaction reveal that, while in Britain levels
are high and relatively stable, similar measures of satisfaction have risen markedly
in Denmark over the last three decades, but have fallen dramatically in Belgium.
Alternative indices of national well-being are detailed in the report, ranging from
those that adopt a traditional gross national product algebra but incorporate
environmental factors, to ``genuine progress indicators'' that value leisure time and
other nonmonetary factors, to ``social progress indexes'' that rather alarmingly
include rises in the percentage of the population sharing the same mother tongue,
religious beliefs, and racial origins as positive trends (Strategy Unit, 2003, page 57). No
comment was made in the report on the value of such socially contentious indices,
which presumably represents naivety and oversight rather than any tacit sympathy
with such measures. However, the report also illustrates that, when simple quantita-
tive approaches are followed, the gross maximisation of human happiness often
implies policies that are likely to work to the detriment of minorities. Being tough
on `criminals', `asylum seekers', the `work-shy', and so on may serve to make a large
number of other people temporarily feel slightly better.
Questions of human happiness and life satisfaction often implicitly inform social
science, but are rarely made explicit. In particular, the darker side of happinessö
taking solace in others' misfortuneöis rarely studied. The happiness that is derived
from living in a large house, having a permanent job, or even a stable relationship may
be partly a product of knowing how many others lack such benefits. A similar argu-
ment could be made for the less tangible aspects of happiness highlighted in the report.
(1) Hansard Commons Debates 10 December 1998, column 277.
956 CommentariesFor instance, to what degree are people with particular religious beliefs happier than
average because they perceive people without their beliefs as lacking something? Much
is said about the politics of envy, but very little on the politics of avarice.
The Strategy Unit's report ends with a series of policy implications, divided into
three categories: those the authors see as noncontroversial, controversial, and more
controversial. Among the first group are subsidising relationships (from funding
volunteering schemes to marriage counselling) and improving the welfare state,
education, and government information. Among the middle group are suggestions
to include happiness measures in cost^benefit analyses; to increase democratic
involvement through referenda; and to reduce the corruption of government. Among
the apparently most controversial group of policy options to maximise happiness
are prioritising the welfare of poorer nations; protecting individuals from risk;
increasing progressive taxation; increasing leisure time; and reducing the consump-
tion of positional goods (such as luxury cars). What is perhaps most telling about
the report and the Strategy Unit's thinking is the threefold categorisation of these
policy options. The assumption is that government would rather see that we became
happier through the modification of our personal views and social relationships
than to address the social inequalities that are the seeds of much current unhappiness
through, for example, progressive taxation. Considering the question of education, on
thisöaccording to their categorisationöuncontroversial issue, the report suggests:
``Young peopleöand adultsöcan be given information and guidance about the
factors that drive life satisfaction. Going one step further, mutual respect, cooper-
ative behaviour and volunteering can be encouraged, while deceit, greed and envy
could be actively discouraged'' (Strategy Unit, 2003, page 37).
Be cheerful, strive to be happy, but don't worry too much about the thorny and
controversial issues of the poorest nations of the world, about inequalities within
national societies or between peoples internationally, or about who should be paying
more tax. Perhaps the Strategy Unit's report requires more airtime and considered
responses than it has thus far attracted.
Danny Dorling, Neil Ward
School of Geography, University of Leeds
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